Egalitarianism and public perception of social inequities: A case study of Beijing congestion charge by Liu, Q et al.
This is a repository copy of Egalitarianism and public perception of social inequities: A 
case study of Beijing congestion charge.




Liu, Q orcid.org/0000-0003-0953-7050, Lucas, K orcid.org/0000-0002-4009-7017, 
Marsden, G orcid.org/0000-0003-3570-2793 et al. (1 more author) (2019) Egalitarianism 
and public perception of social inequities: A case study of Beijing congestion charge. 
Transport Policy, 74. pp. 47-62. ISSN 0967-070X 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2018.11.012





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
Egalitarianism and Public Perception of Social Inequities: A Case Study of Beijing Congestion Charge  
Abstract 
Egalitarian thought has a long tradition in Chinese history. Synthesized with the socialist ideology, it was 
practiced nationwide in the first decades of Communist China. Alongside the well-reported quality of life 
improvements that the recent economic liberalisation reforms have brought about, Chinese people are 
experiencing an increasingly serious polarization between the rich and the poor. Consequently, an egalitarian 
tendency has represented itself within contemporary policy and popular discourse.  
This paper aims to explore how egalitarian thought has influenced public awareness of social inequities by 
using the case of public attitudes towards the Beijing congestion charge, which is currently still at its planning 
stage. Nine focus groups, with a total of 73 participants, were undertaken with residents living in different 
areas of the city. Results show that the perceptions of social inequities are significantly different between 
low-income and high-income people. Due to egalitarian thinking, low-income people expect the privileges of 
the rich to be abolished, however, they do not pay much attention to a wider redistribution of wealth and other 
social resources. By contrast, richer people tend to deny to a wider population the privileges they themselves 
received, and, to some extent, they are reluctant to accept policy outcomes that may favour those who are in 
lower social positions. The resentment against the rich, as another by-product of egalitarianism, considerably 
exaggerates actual social inequalities, thereby intensifying the feelings of being unequally treated.  
Key words: Egalitarian thought; congestion charge; social equity, transport, Beijing 
1. Introduction 
 Several restraint measures have been implemented in Beijing to alleviate traffic congestion in the past 
ten years, such as end-number license plate policy, which restricts automobiles inside the 5th ring road of 
Beijing to enter urban roads based on the last digit number of license plates, and a license plate lottery, which 
requires individual purchasers waiting for the monthly license plate lottery to have passenger cars registered. 
The Government announced, and experts in the transport field endorsed, that these policies have been 
effective in alleviating traffic congestion (Beijing Municipal Commission of Transport, 2011). However, 
according to a survey conducted by the Municipal Commission of Transport, around 80% of Beijing residents 
did not perceive these measures as effective (The Beijing News, 2011).  
Therefore, congestion charge was highlighted as the next policy to be implemented by official documents 
and official cadres since 2011. In September 2011, it was first indicated that research on congestion charge in 
big cities should be carried out in an official document (Ministry of Public Security, et al., 2011). Later, an 
official disclosed the information that congestion charging would be implemented in some big cities by the 
end of 2012 (Caijing, 2012). In 2013, Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau issued a document 
mentioning Beijing congestion charge would be set out in the near future (China Daily, 2013).  
Although the idea of congestion charge has been discussed by scholars in China since 2011, the 
municipal authorities did not give an unequivocal signal that the charge is going to be implemented until 
December, 2015. Massive smog had prompted the Chinese government to issue its first ever air pollution red 
alert in Beijing. The Government announced that a pilot congestion charge would be studied in 2016 (The 
Guardian, 2015). Online debate has been heating up again recently in Beijing with the public concern about 
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the effects of the policy. Hence, the study that forms the focus of this paper was designed to pick up on public 
acceptability of the congestion charge in Beijing.  
This paper is set in the context of a wider set of social issues, all with equality issues at their core. 
Chinese egalitarianism and its impact on public perceptions of transport related social inequities will be 
discussed in this paper. Unexpectedly for the researcher, the issues of equality, equity and fairness (used 
synonymously throughout the paper, as they are all the same word in Chinese), which are the main focus of 
this paper, of the congestion charge policy came up in an evolutionary way from the data, which consisted of 
interviews with expert stakeholders and focus groups with lay citizens. It was unexpected because Chinese 
society is increasingly being described as materialistic since the Economic Reform in 1978 (e.g. Podoshen, et 
al., 2011), and the Chinese government has placed great emphasis on material well-being Social equity has 
always been subordinated to a loftier goal: revolution in the Mao era and economic growth in the post-Mao 
era. Although all of the three main topics in focus group discussions were about costs and benefits, perceived 
effectiveness of the congestion charge, and people's expectations of the outcome of the policy, social equity 
issues overflowed into all of these topics. However, the issue is understood in a different way in China than in 
the Western world, and this is largely due to its egalitarian thought processes and practices throughout history.  
It is both timely and appropriate to conduct research into the public acceptability of transport policies in 
the Chinese context because it has not previously been systematically examined within the academic or policy 
literature. Firstly, it is still questionable to what extent public acceptability of a transport policy is related to 
social equity in the Chinese context. Secondly, although transport-related social inequality issues have aroused 
some scholars' attention in China, the discussions are very much based on Western interpretations of equity.  
The paper starts with review of the Chinese traditional notion of equity in section 2.1, and a review of 
congestion charging as related to social equity issues in the Western context in section 2.2. Section 3 describe 
the methodology. In section 4, we identify four types of social inequity is influencing the public acceptability 
of congestion charge in China. Furthermore, we find evidence suggesting that Chinese egalitarian thought 
exaggerates actually measured levels of social inequalities, and prompts feelings of being oppressed by the 
privileged classes. In section 5, we discuss how Chinese egalitarianism has influence people's perceptions of 
transport-related social equity issues, and how it further influences public acceptability of transport policies. 
This study, therefore, provides some new insights into a discussion of transport equity in this previously 
underexplored Chinese context.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Chinese Egalitarianism 
The most far-reaching aphorism of the Chinese idea of social equality is Confucius's theory of "Bu Huan 
Gua Er Huan Bu Jun" (translated as "we are not troubled with fears of poverty but are troubled with fears of a 
lack of equality of wealth" by Dawson, 1915) (Legge, 2009; Chu & Gardner, 1990). Not only did Confucius 
focus on instrumental aspects of business ethics, but also correlated moral cultivation with distributive justice 
(e.g.: Ip, 2009). It is noticeable that the Confucian idea of equality inclines to egalitarianism, advocating 
abolishment of relative poverty. Apart from the philosophical foundation of the Chinese understanding of 
equality, it is at least of equal importance to look at public perceptions of social equity because, arguably, it is 
the perception, rather than actual experiences of social inequality, that directly influence public acceptability 
of a policy.  
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What history exhibits is that the ideal distribution modal of wealth for society is an absolutely equal 
distribution (e.g.: Riskin, et al., 2001; Vermeer, 2004). There is a clear historical evolutionary process of 
Chinese egalitarianism at play here amongst contemporary public attitudes. At first, peasants' desires were 
confined only to an equal distribution of wealth since they believed the fundamental caused of inequality was 
the land system. Next, they appealed against unequal political rights. In later period of ancient China, this 
egalitarian tradition expanded to an institutional level into peasants' opposition to landowners, their land 
system, and autocracy (see. Zhao, 1986; Wilkinson, 2000; Rawski & Li, 1992). Major examples from peasant 
revolts in Chinese history show that egalitarianism has always been adopted as the most powerful slogan to 
call out for public support for the uprising (e.g.: Little, 1989; Christiansen & Rai, 2014). Unlike the ruling and 
scholar-bureaucrat classes1, who based their understanding of equality on Confucian theory, peasant revolts in 
China were always tinged with elements of religion and mysticism, especially religious Taoism (e.g.: Ping, 
2001). With these religious interpretations, the egalitarian concept was further strengthened, rising from a 
pragmatic expectation of acquiring proper wealth and political rights to a spiritual sustenance of a utopian 
society. 
However, although egalitarianism could be a lethal weapon to undermine the base regime of feudal 
dynasties, it has never established as a practical administrative system. Those who held the slogan of 
egalitarianism were always alienated after gaining power and became privileged classes after they won a 
partial victory (e.g.: Spence, 1996; Reilly, 2004). In other words, peasants' egalitarianism might be good for 
destroying an unequal system, but it has never established a more equal one. 
After Chinese people overthrew the imperial autarchy in the Revolution of 1911, political, social, cultural, 
and economical turmoil continued until the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Even though the 
Communist Party has formed a set of new systems and orders in China, these orders were unstable over time, 
and have been constantly transforming. Perhaps the best example of egalitarianism in the Communist China is 
the Great Leap Forward (see. Bachman, 2006; MacFarquhar & Mao, 1989). This was an economic and social 
campaign led by Chairman Mao, which aimed to rapidly transform the country from a traditional agricultural 
society to a socialist society through industrialization (e.g. Yang, 2008). It ended in catastrophe and caused the 
Great Chinese Famine between the years 1959 to 1962, whose victims are estimated to be between 18 million 
to 46 million (Yang, 2008; Ó Gráda, 2011; Kung & Lin, 2003; Dikötter, 2010; Yang, 2012).  
Although Chairman Mao had previously criticized egalitarianism, it is evident that the idea of the Great 
Leap Forward is significantly influenced by egalitarian thought (e.g. Bian, 2002). In 1958, people's communes 
were decided to be the new form of fundamental organization throughout rural China, which had 
governmental, political and economic functions (e.g. Zweig, 1983). In the communes, everything originally 
owned by individuals or households such as private animals, stored grains and items in the private kitchen was 
contributed to the commune, and everything was shared by its members (Dikötter, 2010; Shen & Xia, 2011). 
This ‘absolute equal’ distribution of wealth severely discouraged the enthusiasm of production and finally 
resulted in a nationwide economic recession (e.g. Chen & Zhou, 2007). 
However, contrary to equal distribution at grassroots level, the special treatment and domineering 
behaviours of cadres were also a common phenomenon. All rural resources were controlled and managed by 
the communes; all productive activities were also assigned by commune cadres (e.g. Domes, 1982; Zhang et 
al., 2004). It strongly exacerbated public dissatisfaction with cadres when millions of people were suffering 
                                                            
1
 also known as Literati, were civil servants appointed by the emperor of China to perform day-to-day governance from the Han 
dynasty to the end of the Qing dynasty in 1912 
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starvation. Thus, the egalitarian thoughts precipitated an unavoidable conflict between cadres and peasants, 
and finally became an essential factor that supported and aggravated the Cultural Revolution (e.g.: 
MacFarquhar, 1997; Lieberthal, 1995; Barnouin & Yu, 1993). 
Given that the spiritual foundation of the Great Leap Forward was merely a stratified, economic 
egalitarianism, the egalitarian thoughts reflected in the Cultural Revolution were generalized to political 
egalitarianism, to some extent (See. Jin, 1999; Lee, 1980). Since the implementation of Reform and Open 
policy, it has been a social and economic transition period all along (See. Howell, 1993; Wu, 2010). 
Egalitarianism then presents itself in public discourses on social hotspot issues, such as the congestion charge. 
In summary, due to the persistence of egalitarian thought within Chinese cultural history, Chinese people 
may have a feeling of being oppressed, thereupon expressing a desire for the egalitarian redistribution of 
resources. Egalitarian thoughts may prompt people to take emotional reactions to the proposed congestion 
scheme which could adversely influence the effectiveness of the policy. Since egalitarian thoughts are deeply 
rooted in Chinese people's mind, attempts at eliminating the impact of egalitarianism is infeasible in short 
term. It is, thus, important for policy-makers to consider the impact of egalitarianism on public perception of 
social inequities in the transport domain. This suggests that the influence of egalitarian thoughts could 
influence other political affairs which may, in turn, indirectly influence the effectiveness of proposed transport 
policies in ways that might not ordinarily be expected in terms of their public unacceptability. 
 
2.2 Transport Related Social Inequities in the Western Context 
Many studies have shown that rapid economic growth and urbanization process in developing countries 
in Asia and the global south almost always come along with social inequalities (e.g. Kanbur & Zhang, 2005; 
Shatkin, 2007). Since "giving priority to efficiency with due consideration to equity" was adopted as the 
principle of resource allocation at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 14th CPC Central Committee in 1993, social 
equity has been subordinated to development and economic growth. Few Chinese transport policymakers have 
really considered the issue of social equity in policy-making process and neither has it been a topic of research 
within the Chinese academic literature, but it is increasingly the focus of Western literature. As such, we must 
turn to these Western literature to determine whether or not they can be a useful basis for understanding issues 
of equity in the Chinese context. 
There is a large body of literature on transport related social equity in the last decade. The discussions 
about transport related social equity mainly focus on four aspects: (a) philosophical theorisation of social 
equity in the transport domain (e.g. Martens, 2012; Martens, 2017; Lucas, et al. 2015, Hananel & Berechman, 
2016); (b) accessibility (e.g. Martens & Ciommo, 2017; Pereira, et al., 2017; Neutens, et al., 2012); (c) the 
distribution of cost and benefits (e.g. Murray & Davis, 2001; Ogilvie & Goodman, 2012; Martens 2017); and 
(d) transport related social exclusion (e.g. Lucas, 2006, 2012; Schwanen, et al., 2015; Currie, et al., 2009).  
The equity issue has also been more specifically identified as one of the key elements of the public 
acceptability of road pricing, regarding the distribution of its costs and benefits (e.g. Schlag and Teubel, 1997; 
Schade, & Schlag, 2003; Jaensirisak, 2005). For example, Metz (2002) identified equity as one of the main 
problems of road pricing because it is less equitable than the relatively egalitarian transport system at present. 
Similarly, Viegas (2001) looked at the reasons for political hostility towards road pricing schemes, the author 
found there is an inescapable trend that some kind of resources need to be reallocated during the process of 
achieving equity. This corroborates the relationship between revenue allocation and equity, which are 
common within Western congestion pricing policies.  
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Schlag and Teubel (1997) argued that the interpersonal (social) and interregional (spatial) aspects should 
both be included when considering equity issues in public acceptability of road pricing measures. Equity 
issues were also extensively discussed by Raux and Souche (2004). Based on Rawl's theory of social justice. 
The authors identified three types of equity which should be considered in a road pricing scheme, namely 
spatial equity, horizontal equity, and vertical equity. Kim et al. (2013) substantiated and enriched these 
previous studies on the relationship between equity and public acceptability by investigating the determinants 
of acceptability of environmental taxation. Their results revealed that fairness was the most direct determinant 
of public acceptability of pricing measures.  
However, it has rarely been discussed how real and perceived inequity is different. Levinson (2010) 
revealed that the perceived inequity is highly subjective. A policy which is considered to be equitable to 
researchers or policy makers may not be recognised as equitable to an individual affected by the policy. Fujii 
et al., (2004) showed that perceived fairness is the most significant factor influencing public acceptance of 
road pricing. Furthermore, although public acceptability of congestion charge has been widely discussed in 
the Western context, it cannot be automatically assumed that this concept is transferable to the Chinese 
context given its entirely different underpinning philosophical cultures for understanding the meanings of 
equity (Marsden & Stead, 2011).  
In this paper, we, therefore, argue that different cultures will have different understandings of notions 
such as distribution, fairness, and accountability. The literature on Chinese egalitarianism suggests that 
Chinese people expect for a deprival of privileges rather than an absolutely equal distribution of wealth. 
Besides, their equity concerns are not about cost-and-benefits of the proposed scheme but the differences of 
the living conditions between the perceived privileged groups and themselves. Therefore, there is a gap in the 
literature where we need to understand the perception of social inequities in the unique Chinese context, 
shrouded in the traditions of egalitarianism, and its impact on public acceptability on road pricing scheme 
from these perspectives.  
 
3. Methodology 
Since the political system, as well as culture, in the Chinese context is far different from that of the 
Western context, it is doubtful that a Western-based methodological framework could be used for assessing 
the role of egalitarianism in the public acceptability of policies in China. Therefore, an exploratory qualitative 
study was first required in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the issues and to test assumptions prior 
to designing a larger quantitative study (King, 1994). By using qualitative research, the researcher could 
develop a systematic exploratory understanding of public acceptability issues based on the Chinese context, 
rather than merely adopting the Western framework with some fragmentary Chinese characteristics.  
At first, interviews were conducted with 12 expert stakeholders including policy-makers, scholars and 
former officials to explore whether and why public acceptability might be an issue for Chinese policy makers. 
Nine focus groups, with a total of 73 participants, were then conducted with a range of different groups of lay 
citizens (see table 1 below) to explore which factors influence public acceptability of the policy and to what 
extent they think congestion charge is acceptable. The paper concentrates only on focus groups data.  
 
3.1 Hypothetical Cordon-based Charging Scheme 
Since the policy was still at the planning stage at the time of our study, participants might be aware of the 
general idea of a congestion charge but did not have a shared understanding of the policy. Therefore, we 
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provided them with different kinds of charging schemes in the participant information sheet and a hypothetical 
cordon-based charging scheme was introduced as the basis for the discussion.  
 
Figure 1 The Hypothetical Charging zone within the Metropolitan Area of Beijing 
The urban road network of Beijing could be categorized into: ring roads (the 2nd to 6th ring road), toll 
expressway connecting central and suburban areas, and other local roads (see Figure 1). The 5th ring road 
roughly delimits the boundary between the urban and suburban areas. The area inside the 3rd ring road was 
selected as the charging zone (shown in Figure 1(a)) because area between the 2nd and 3rd ring roads is the 
most congested in Beijing (TPI, Beijing Transport Research Centre, 2011). We adopted a simple hypothetical 
charging policy that 50 yuan will be charged for driving a car within the charging zone between 7:00 and 
18:00, as complex charging methods (e.g. Wu, et al., 2017) because it could be difficult for participants to 
understand and the research does not focus on the charging strategy. We also provided different charging 
schemes in the participant information sheet including different charges (10 CNY, 20CNY, 50CNY) and 
highlighted that the price and charging zones are hypothetical and is open for discussion. 
 
3.2 Recruiting and Grouping Process 
The recruiting process was complex because most of Chinese citizens are not familiar with focus groups 
and they are generally unwilling to participate in activities which involve face-to-face open discussions. 
Therefore, the researchers first organised three online discussions with people who had expressed their ideas 
about the congestion charge policy on social media. After online discussions, we asked the participants to 
explain details of the research to their acquaintances in Beijing and invite them to participate in face to face 
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focus groups. These online discussions were used for recruiting only because around half of the participants 
did not live in Beijing and so were not in scope for the main study, which focused only on Beijing residents. 
Although 58 Beijing residents introduced through online discussion participants were willing to 
participate, most of them were young people and lived within the third ring road. In order to control for 
sample selection bias, therefore, these 58 people were asked to deliberately invite people who were more 
difficult for researchers to access, such as the elderly. We received another 77 positive responses after this 
additional recruitment process. 
An additional focus group with taxi and bus drivers was conducted after finishing all the other eight 
focus groups. It was unexpected that most professional drivers who talked with us wanted the congestion 
charge to happen, while the majority of people in the initial 8 groups held a negative opinion about the policy. 
In order to figure out what causes this expectation, the researcher invited three taxi drivers, two bus drivers 
and one member of staff in a subway station to run another focus group. 
Finally, a total of 73 Beijing residents participated in the focus group discussions. The participants were 
then clustered into eight groups (shown in Table 1). The distribution of focus group participants is shown in 
Figure 2. The rule of the grouping process guaranteed that participants in one group did not meet each other 
beforehand. Initially, we planned to have around ten people per group. Since there were too many young 
volunteers, they were randomly selected to participate in discussions.   
 
. Table 1 Cluster of Participants 
 Old To Beijing New Settlers Additional 
 Inner City (inside the 
3rd ring road) 
Outer City (outside the 
3rd ring road) 






Young Elder Young Elder Young Elder  
Sample 
Size 
9 8 6 6 10 9 11 8 6 
    Former Rural Hukou Holders  





Figure 2 The Distribution of Focus Group Participants 
 
3.3 Focus-group Discussions 
The biggest barriers to conducting a focus group in China is that participants prefer listening to talking 
when they are sitting in a room with strangers. Also, it is highly likely that either someone dominates the 
whole discussion, or everyone awkwardly looks at each other and says nothing. In either case, we cannot 
adequately gather information and ideas from across different perspectives and attitudinal positions. In order 
to encourage people to express their own idea and to really debate with other participants, the moderator 
carried on a short conversation (15-30 min, online or face-to-face chat) with every participant before focus 
group discussion. The purposes of the short interviews were: (a) first and foremost, to make the participants 
feel comfortable and confident to talk about the issues at hand because many participants felt they were 
incapable of expressing their opinions about the policy because they were not an expert in transport field; and 
more importantly, (b) to give the moderator an opportunity to have an initial impression of the participants 
and their ability to contribute to a group discussion. Those who held relatively extreme views were noted and 
9 
 
then encouraged to express their ideas at the beginning of the focus groups, which stimulated people holding 
similar or opposite views to express their own ideas and debate with each other. This ‘stimulator’ strategy was 
very effective, as all of the participants actively joined in the subsequent discussions.  
In order to avoid asking biased questions, the moderator only posed very general questions, for example, 
"what do you think about the policy, what benefits and problems might it bring?" A question about revenue 
allocation was asked at the end of discussions if the participants did not mention anything about revenue since 
revenue allocation was identified as one of the most important determinants of public acceptability in the 
Western literature (e.g. Eliasson & Mattsson, 2006; Hensher & Puckett, 2007).  
Each discussion lasted average 104 min, ranging from 86 to 145 min. All conversations were recorded 
and transcribed. All the transcripts were translated into English by the researcher in preparation for subsequent 
analysis. Since we intend to explore what is underlying the public acceptability issue in the Chinese context, 
an inductive category development approach was adopted (Thomas, 2006). We did two rounds of manual 
coding in which Liu and Liu independently completed the coding process. The Chinese version of transcripts 
were used in the first round and the translated version were used in the second round. The aim of the exercise 
was to minimise the extent to which the meaning of content was changed through translation. After coding, 
we clustered the codes into different categories. Then the list of categories was used to go through the 
transcripts again to confirm that the categories could accurately represent the participants' ideas and to explore 
the interactions between different categories. Themes were discussed in meetings with co-authors and other 
experts in this field. 
To more systematically analyse the data, the software package NVivo 11 was used to organise, code, 
categorise, and visualise the data. The research team generated a list of 1074 codes ('nodes' in NVivo), and 
then categorised them into 23 themes ('parent nodes' in NVivo). After coding, several rounds of analyses were 
carried out, including linking themes, selecting representative quotations, and generating theories that were 
grounded in the data. Four key themes about equity emerged from this deep analysis: i) Government & lay 
citizens, ii) income equality, iii) equity between Pekingese and migrants, and iv) differences between Beijing 
and other cities. While 'privilege' is at the core of all themes about equity. Some codes which could not fit into 
a hierarchical tree ('free nodes' in NVivo) were included as the links between two themes, for example the 
code 'cause more social problems' is the link between 'perceived effectiveness of congestion charge' and 
'privilege'. The coding and thematising process were visualised in a thematic map. (shown in Figure 3). 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
Appendix 1 offers a detailed overview of all the key themes and issues that emerged across all the focus 
groups and confirms social equity as a dominant concern. Although the research was primarily designed and 
conducted for a more general study of the public acceptability issues of congestion charge in Beijing, social 
equity issues became overwhelmingly important in the interviews with policymakers, and even more so in the 
focus group discussions with lay citizens. It was totally unexpected that most participants identified equity as 
one of the major concerns of the policy. Other core themes besides issues of equity also emerged, as shown in 
Appendix 2, but as these were largely exogenous to the topic of this paper, and also were not the focus of this 
Special Issue, they will be explored elsewhere. 
Most participants seemed to think that the congestion policy is unacceptable because they believe it will 
be in some way unfair, and/or it may worsen current social inequity problems in the City. Participants 
discussed this issue from various perspectives, from which we will first go through four types of perceived 
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inequities and then we can sketch a clear narrative of how Chinese egalitarian thoughts have influence 
people's perceptions of social inequities. 
 
4.1 Inequity: The Government and the Public 
Most of the participants thought that the congestion charge could be inequitable because government car 
users will possibly be the only winners. None of the participants believed Government car users themselves 
will need to pay the charge, thus, non-Government car users will sacrifice their personal interests to deliver a 
better service for the elite cadres. As one of the participants said: 
There are still a lot of Government cars, especially in Beijing. If, ideally, they could be 
scrupulous in separating public from private interests, in other words, they don't charge 
government cars, it is absolutely unfair. However, if they also charge Government cars, 
then who pays for that? Of course, the Government, that is to say, tax payers pay for that. 
So, in other words, we pay for them. That is a little unreasonable. [Female, Younger than 
45, Pekingese, Outer Beijing] 
Some participants thought that Government cars are the actual cause of congestion in Beijing. For example:  
Maybe we should try to ban 90% government vehicles, and then we see whether the 
problem is solved. If the problem is not yet solved by a government vehicle ban, we could 
sit down and reasonably discuss implementing congestion charge. [Male, Younger than 
45, Pekingese, Outer Beijing] 
Most of the participants thought that the policy would assign a disguised privilege to Government car 
users, which means corrupt cadres would benefit from the policy. Even though some of them acknowledge 
that and apparently feel unsatisfied with the situation, they are inclined to accept the fact. As one of the 
participants explained: 
I'm not that idealistic. I know you can't expect they are going to charge themselves [...]. 
So, I think we have to leave it alone, we should not think about government vehicles when 
we think about this policy, otherwise we will get very resentful. For me, if every car needs 
to pay the same amount of money, I think that's fine. [Male, Younger than 45, Pekingese, 
Inner Beijing] 
Even though the Chinese socialist ideology places emphasis on class conflict, the conflict between 
officials and lay citizens remains the prevailing social conflict after the Qin Dynasty. With the increasing 
exposure of corruption after economic reform, the public has been filled with deep resentment against corrupt 
cadres. Some behaviours, as they are considered to be some sort of privilege, could arouse a sense of social 
inequity, such as Government cars for general use. 
It was evident that participants reached a consensus on what should be considered as a social inequity 
issue in this context. In their opinion, social inequity is about inequalities of treatment between different 
groups of lay citizens, while inequalities between cadres and lay citizens were considered as irresistible and 
inevitable. The public wrest the slogan of "Bu Huan Gua Er Huan Bu Jun" from Confucianism and turn it into 
a request for egalitarian distribution of wealth. However, this so-called egalitarian distribution is built on 
admitting the fact that cadres do have political and economic privileges.  
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This notion of equity is far different from egalitarianism in the Western context since lay citizens do not 
expect an absolutely equal distribution but an equal distribution between lay citizens. Cadres at all levels, 
meanwhile, are regarded as representatives of the highest authority who implement the guidelines of the 
central committee.2 Thus, lay citizens do not dare to officially criticize cadres, albeit with a growing antipathy 
towards government corruption. Nevertheless, the antipathy does not vanish, but transfer to antipathies 
towards other groups of lay citizens. 
 
4.2 Inequity: The Rich and the Poor 
A high degree of income inequality remains to be one of the most noticeable consequence of China's 
economic reform. Han et al. (2016) argued that China can hardly call itself a socialist country since the huge 
inequality in all aspects is way more serious than in European countries, including those typical capitalist 
countries. However, Chinese people always expect a ‘socialist distribution’, as the Government has effectively 
propagated.  
To achieve the Socialist Ideal, policies were implemented to maintain an equal income distribution in the 
Mao era. However, the Gini coefficient has climbed from 0.3 to 0.55 from the beginning of the Economic 
Reform to 2012 (Xie & Zhou, 2014). The great disparity in income equality before and after the Economic 
Reform has arguably exaggerated public perceptions of the polarization between the rich and poor. Many 
Chinese people, especially those who have experienced a series of socialist movements in 50s and 60s, exude 
nostalgia for the egalitarian past when they are thinking about the rich-poor gap at present. For example, one 
of the participants said: 
Back to 80s, or 90s we don't have such serious, such intense social contradictions. Not 
like nowadays, we blame each other, I think it's because the society is becoming more and 
more unequal, and that's what makes us feel nervous. [...] I don't have a car, I also want 
to have a car, but I can't afford it. So, because of this [congestion charge] policy, I know 
it's more unlikely for me to own a car now. But on the other side, I become glad secretly 
that some people who are just a little richer than me cannot use their cars. So, they will 
not laugh at me, because you know those who have a similar economic status with you 
would laugh at you most. [Male, Older than 45, New Migrant, Outer Beijing] 
A notion of egalitarianism is clearly embodied in this quote. On the one hand, the participant worried 
about the situation that people around him have something that he does not have, rather than car use itself, on 
the other hand, depriving other people of that car was regarded as favourable and equal, even though he 
himself cannot derive any benefit from the deprival.  
The majority of the participants, especially poor people, suspected that driving would become another 
privilege of the rich again.  
I think the policy makes public owned urban roads a scarce commodity, which means rich 
people can use it, but poor people cannot use it. [Female, Younger than 45, Pekingese, 
Outer city] 
                                                            
2
 This could be deemed as a legacy of Legalism and Confucianism. In short, this conbines an absolute loyalty to the highest authority 
from Legalism and the clannish ethical principles from Confucianism.  
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Whilst a few rich people think it is equitable to make driving a privilege. They considered the policy as 
an inevitable trend because roads, as one kind of limited resources, should not be free of charge. 
We are born to be unequal. So, I don't think the policy is something that oppress people. 
[...] Rich people could drive not because they are rich, it is because they pay for that. If 
they don't pay, they also cannot drive. I don't think it's something unfair. [Male, Younger 
than 45, new migrant, Inner Beijing] 
It implies that rich people regard driving as a public service, whereas poorer people regard it as a right 
that every resident should have. Thus, despite the fact that the majority of the participants are not satisfied 
with the policy, the underlying causes are different. The rich wanted to buy comfort and convenience, 
hesitating whether the policy could reach their expectations for this, whilst the majority of the participants 
realized that the policy could widen the social inequity. Because of the increasing social inequities, poorer 
people appear to be unwilling to cooperate in reinforcing privileges of the rich. It could also be reflected in 
their expectations of how to charge and who should be charged. 
If you are going to charge us, please charge those rich people more, you should charge 
those luxury cars more. Right? They should pay more than us. I think the policy should 
have the same constraint on those rich people. For example, if half of people, I mean 
people like us, are affected by this policy, then half of rich people should be affected as 
well. If we drive 30% less than before, those rich people should also drive 30% less, at 
least 20%. [Female, Younger than 45, Pekingese, Inner Beijing] 
After the Economic Reform, the egalitarian distribution of wealth had been phased out but egalitarianism 
has been deeply imprinted on Chinese people's mind. An absolutely equal charge seems not enough for the 
public. Most of the participants usually considered themselves as people who should pay the lowest charge 
and suggested that richer people should pay more to avoid the privilege of the rich, but they never mentioned 
poorer people should pay less. However, it is an extremely subjective criterion for assessing whether an 
individual is rich or poor. It is interesting that the majority of the participants did not perceived themselves as 
rich people, including those who own more than two cars, a few properties in Beijing and even a man who 
own a company which had some forty employees. Also, because of egalitarianism, solving congestion or 
smog problem is low on their list of priorities – everyone suffers from these problems, but some may suffer 
more from solving the problems.  
Therefore, it is doubtful that an absolutely equal distribution is exactly what people desire. It could be 
more accurate to describe the so-called egalitarian distribution as to equally not have something rather than 
equally to have it. People with egalitarian thoughts urge the policy-maker to take more from the rich but they 
don't really request for anything that the rich have. Therefore, the most probable consequence of 
egalitarianism is making the rich poorer rather than making the poor richer. 
However, people's expectation of the egalitarian distribution of wealth may not be as emotional as it 
appears. There are indications that when participants were indignant with richer people, they actually implied 
the connection between wealth and power-for-money deals. In other words, they are infuriated by a dishonest 
way to be wealthy rather than wealth itself, forasmuch as there is a faint possibility that lay citizens could 
have the same access to resources and information as corrupt cadres do. Hence, the rich are regarded as the 




4.3 Inequity: Residents of Beijing and Other Cities 
Unlike income inequality, spatial inequalities have always existed since the beginning of Communist 
China. Although rural areas had been the high ground of Socialist ideology in 60s and 70s, urban-biased 
policies had been implemented to achieve rapid industrialisation (e.g. Li & Yang, 2005; Meisner, 1999). 
Post-reform policies have further contributed to the expanding urban-rural inequalities (Lu & Chen, 2006). 
Besides, preferential policies have brought about significant regional disparity between coastal and interior 
provinces (Démurger, et al., 2002b).  
Many people want to stay in Beijing even though they could have ten times better quality 
of life if they live in some other cities. You see those people who do the dirtiest, hardest 
job, many of them are actually educated. They could do many other things if they went 
back to their hometown, but they insist on staying here. [...] When I was young I couldn't 
feel a great difference between Beijing and a capital city of a province. [...] But after the 
Reform and Opening up, several cities develop way faster than others, so there are more 
problems in those cities. Not only transport. [Female, Older than 45, Pekingese, Outer 
Beijing] 
Transport facilities are identified to be one of the major factors differentiating regional development 
(Démurger, 2001). However, transport-related spatial inequalities are not limited to transport facilities. 
Transport policies can also be spatially unequal, such as the Beijing congestion charge. Most participants, 
including new migrants originally from surrounding area of Beijing, considered it is inequitable that only 
Beijing residents need to pay. Since the authority has announced that a pilot congestion charge will be studied 
after the red alert of air pollution, the policy is widely regarded as a solution to the smog problem. 
Accordingly, it was deemed unequal that only Beijing residents need to pay extra money for air pollution.  
 
I think the policy could be implemented in other cities as well, at least those cities around 
Beijing, for example Tianjin, Shijiazhuang. [...] It's more equal for us, because the smog 
problem is a nationwide problem, it's not only our problem. We are responsible for that 
and they should be responsible for that too. So, I think they should pay too. [Male, Older 
than 45, Pekingese, Outer Beijing] 
Participants, on the one hand, doubted the effectiveness of congestion charge, on the other hand, do not 
want to be the only victims of a policy which aimed at alleviating the nationwide smog problem. Thus, 
Beijing residents thought it could be more equitable if the policy is not only implemented in Beijing. It is 
clearly influenced by egalitarianism that participants expect to take something away from others in order to 
achieve an egalitarian distribution. It verifies that taking things owned by others could ingratiate the public 
because of the egalitarian thought.  
However, when most of Pekingese complained about the charge, they did not mention any distinct 
advantages over other regions that Beijing has enjoyed because of the urban-biased policy and the special 
political position of Beijing.  
Migrants' perceptions of inequities between residents of Beijing and other cities were more complex than 
Pekingese's. Some inclined to identify themselves as Beijing residents and, to a large extent, agreed with the 
statement that congestion charge is more equitable if it would be implemented in other cities around Beijing. 
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These migrants behaved more like some Pekingese; they considered residents of other cities are taking 
advantages of Beijing congestion charge if only Beijing residents need to pay. It is interesting that almost all 
of migrants who held this opinion were former rural hukou holders. The others, on the contrary, have a strong 
impression of spatial differences between Beijing and their hometown. It further influences their attitude 
towards Beijing and Pekingese, thereby gradually forming their egalitarian expectations.  
 
4.4 Inequity: Pekingese and New Migrants 
Pekingese and new migrants hold different views on equity issues of the road pricing scheme. Most 
Pekingese participants think the congestion charge could be good to the society as a whole. They recalled the 
good environment and blue sky from their childhoods.  
Most of the new riches are outsiders, Beijing is not their hometown, they are just passing 
by. They don't care how our air is polluted. When I was a child I could sit in my home and 
saw the Jingshan Park, now I cannot even see a guy twenty meters away from me. 
[Female, Younger than 45, Pekingese, Inner Beijing] 
Some Pekingese blamed new migrants for air pollution and other social problems. 
Because you know the problem in Beijing is mainly caused by them. Of course, we 
contribute to these problems as well, but you know it's different. For example, I think the 
policy could be good because I think we need such a policy to regulate those new 
migrants. Maybe not all of them, those new riches. [...] Of course, they are rich they can 
go wherever they want, but I think they are parasites of this city. [Male, Younger than 45, 
Pekingese, Outer Beijing] 
While others have sympathy for Beijing drifter because they think Beijing drifters have experienced 
different types of social inequities. 
As a person who are born in Beijing and grow up in Beijing, sometimes I cannot refrain 
from supporting the theory that 'only in the Spring Festival, Beijing is Pekingese's Beijing'. 
[...] A few cars on roads, no congestion, amazing. But I think we can't repel new migrants 
because of this. [...]those people from other cities work hard to get what they want. They 
have the ability to live in this city, why Pekingese could ask them to leave this city? For 
what? Your hukou? [Female, Younger than 45, Pekingese, Outer Beijing] 
New migrants, however, expressed strong discontent with the policy. They believe that as newcomers to 
this city, they have already been unequally treated in every aspect before and after they came to the city. 
Moreover, the policy itself is unequal, not to speak of leading to greater social inequities. 
At the end of autumn, farmers burn those straws and there is very heavy smoke 
everywhere. [...] We have that experience for twenty years. So now, I think it is just 
because there is the same problem in cities now, big cities like Beijing. So, they now think 
it is a problem, it should be solved. We have that experience for twenty years. Who care 
about those farmers? Well not only farmers, people who live in those areas actually, like 
me. And now we come to Beijing, and we need to use our money to improve their air 
quality? [Male, Younger than 45, New migrant, Outer Beijing] 
15 
 
The participant thought that smog has attracted attention because urban residents are now suffering from 
this problem too. However, people who grew up in rural areas have already suffered smog for a much longer 
time. Thus, the participant found it inequitable that rural and urban residents are differently treated. It implies 
the result of urban-biased policies in China and a great urban-rural inequality. It is indubitable that Beijing, as 
the capital city of China, is one of the main beneficiaries of these policies and has the most intense social 
contradictions hidden behind a harmonious appearance. For example, participants indicated that Beijing 
plunders many resources from the rest of the country, especially provinces around Beijing such as Hebei 
province.  
I feel that Beijing has bled my hometown, the whole province. It is almost the worst 
province in this country. Bad economy, worst environment, very bad. The only reason is, 
it's near Beijing, the capital city [...] I realize our young people have already contribute to 
this city, but they (Pekingese) are grabbing everything from our hometown. I can't feel 
happy. I know it's not related to this policy, but I just think it's ridiculous to let those 
contributors to pay this money, you know many of them don't have a Beijing hukou. They 
get no benefit from staying here. [Male, Older than 45, new migrant, Inner Beijing] 
New migrants think Pekingese are born with privileges. Pekingese may not even notice that they are 
sharing resources that new migrants may need decades of hard work to gain access to.  
I know this policy has been implemented in many foreign cities, but you know their 
societies are quite equal. You know, they don't have that privilege of Beijing hukou. You 
know when we moved to here, my child was not allowed to register in a normal secondary 
high school in Beijing because we don't have a Beijing hukou. So our children can only 
study in schools for migrant workers. The educational resources are extremely poor. You 
know, teachers, campus. It's like they intentionally segregate us from them. It's like 
apartheid. [Female, Older than 45, new migrant, Outer Beijing] 
Hukou, a system of population registration which provides the principle basis of establishing identity, 
citizenship, and every aspect of people's daily life (Cheng & Seldon, 1994), remains to be one of the legacies 
of planned economic system, obstructing urbanization and labour mobility (Liang, 2015). Even if new 
migrants could find productive employment, they will be treated as second-class citizens without a Beijing 
Hukou. New migrants do not have the equal access to a series of social resources, such as social security, 
housing subsidies, and education in public schools (Tao & Xu, 2007). Thus, obtaining the Beijing Hukou is 
one of the most prioritised tasks for most new migrants.  
Despite the fact that the congestion charge has no direct relation with the Hukou system, most new 
migrant participants spontaneously categorized the policy as benefits of being Pekingese and exploitation of 
migrant workers. For new migrants, the policy seems to be another privilege of Beijing hukou holders because 
they, as migrants, pay for Pekingese's quality of life. It is evident that new migrant participants do not regard 
Beijing as their home. Therefore, they always have a sense of alienation from Beijing. Although new migrants 
may get the same benefits as Pekingese do, they feel they are unequally treated. This sense of inequity is 
derived from a variety of privileges that the Beijing hukou grants, as well as from the great disparity between 
the development of Beijing and their hometown.  
Egalitarianism has formed Pekingese's and new migrants' views about each other. For Pekingese, people 
who live in Beijing should all have the same responsibility to solve problems in Beijing. In such 
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circumstances, Pekingese sometimes feel it’s reasonable to blame new migrants since they consider new 
migrants cause these problems. For new migrants, Pekingese residents should not have privileges over people 
from other places. People who have different background would have different perceptions of Pekingese's 
privileges, thereby having different senses of being deprived. Both Pekingese and new migrants are expecting 
an egalitarian distribution, of social responsibilities for Pekingese, whilst of social resources for new migrants.  
 
4.5 Resentment against the Privileged Groups 
Privilege featured at the centre of discourses of social inequities. The privileged class was recognised as 
another symbolic effect of market-oriented economic reform. Some particular groups of people who have 
reaped the benefits of the reforms were identified as the privileged class, while others, perceived a strong 
feeling of being oppressed and exploited. For low income people and new migrants, it is clear that rich people 
and Pekingese are the privileged groups. However, Pekingese and the majority of rich people criticised the 
privileged groups as well. Few of them identified themselves as the privileged ones; richer people also saw 
themselves as oppressed and exploited. Since the congestion charge are expected to reduce car use, poorer car 
users indicated that the policy would exacerbate social contradictions between the privileged class and others.  
I think this policy would make prejudice between people more visible. For example, those 
who are still using cars every day may regard themselves head and shoulders above 
others, because they can still use cars. [Female, Young than 45, Pekingese, Inner Beijing] 
The feeling of being oppressed causes a simmering resentment against the rich, which has been a 
widespread social phenomenon in China for decades. It is derived from the negative emotions of relatively 
disadvantaged groups when they actively or passively compare themselves to richer people. People tend to 
take irrational actions to express their resentment against richer people.  
I don't have a private place for parking, so I park my car outdoors. My car got punctures 
for more than four times, scratched for many times, I cannot even remember. [...] They did 
it intentionally. [...] I'm not a rich man alright? I don't even buy a place to park my car 
because it's too expensive. These people just hate whoever is richer than themselves. And 
they don't think about how to work harder, how to make money by their own hands, they 
just hate you because they think you are richer. [Male, Older than 45, new migrant, Inner 
Beijing] 
Public acceptability of congestion charge is very much influenced by this resentment, insomuch as car 
users are regarded as relatively richer people. Due to egalitarianism, the charge is regarded as a proper way to 
alleviate the differences between car users and non-car users to some extent.  
They (supporters of the policy) don't really care about whether this policy meet their 
expectation, they don't care. They just find that this is a good way to let rich people pay 
more. I heard someone said "great, you bought a car then you think you are rich? You 
need to pay for the charge now." Many people support this policy because of this. [Male, 
Older than 45, Pekingese, Inner Beijing] 
It is evident that economic development has very little impact on alleviating discontent about social 
inequities (Lü, 2014). The resentment against the rich, an inevitable consequence of egalitarianism, will 
remain to be one of the most intractable barriers to promoting social equity. Although it is originally caused 
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by social inequities and immoral behaviours of the so-called privileged class, people considerably generalise 
the resentment to a wider population, namely anyone who is richer than themselves.  
Another probable cause of the resentment against the rich is that they are considered to be absolutely 
connected with corruption. This is the reason why most of relatively rich participants did not identify 
themselves as privileged. "The rich" regard to those who use their privileges to make money but not those 
who actually have a lot of money in this context. For relatively richer people, it is clear that they earned their 
money by the sweat of their brows. However, it is difficult for poorer people and migrants to distinguish them 
from "the privileged".  
Most lay citizens have an intimate knowledge about how violent and dishonest the primitive capital 
accumulation was during the early stage of the Economic Reform (e.g. Ngai, 2005; Tanner & Feder, 1993). 
Thus, inappropriate behaviours of the rich morally justify lay citizens' resentment against the rich. Although 
some people are merely indignant at using dishonest ways to become rich, resentment against the rich has 
been notably generalised and extremised (e.g. Yan, 2009; Holmstrom & Smith, 2000). According to the 
participants, it is likely that people would attempt to take emotional and violent reactions to richer people. 
Under these circumstances, those who became a little richer than others by their ability and hard work would 
be the victim of the resentment. It is not uncommon that their hard-earned quality of life may be crushed by a 
group of emotional people with the resentment against the rich (e.g. Huang, 1995; Moise, 2017).  
Figure 3 demonstrates some of the deeper dynamic interactions between the four core topics about equity 
issues identified above. It clearly shows that privilege is the core of perceived inequities. Poorer people 
thought the congestion charge policy was inequitable to them because it would deprive them the right to use 
cars and make it a privilege of the rich. Migrants' perception of privilege was highly correlated with uneven 
regional development. Beijing, the capital city, enjoys unaccountable privileges which are unattainable for 
residents of other regions. Migrants then identified Pekingese as the main beneficiaries of the policy because 
people originally from other regions again pay for improving Pekingese's hometown. Equity issues between 
Government and lay citizens was highly correlated with ‘trust in the Government’ which was another main 
determinants of public acceptability to emerge from the analysis. Moreover, perceived inequity might 
undermine the effectiveness of congestion charge because an ineffective policy was perceived as inequitable 
by some participants. This is because an effective congestion charge would effectively make private car use a 






Figure 3 Dynamic Interactions between Core Topics 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Applications 
The narratives presented above demonstrate how perception of social inequities have led to a generalized 
antipathy towards the Beijing congestion charge, and how egalitarianism thought has shaped these perceived 
social inequities. Figure 4 offer a schematic overview of the key mechanisms that are driving this discontent.  
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Figure 4 Mechanism of Shaping Perceived Transport Related Social Inequities 
Although Whyte (2010) suggested that Chinese people think the current income inequality is acceptable 
and Chinese people are rather optimistic about inequity issues, he cannot deny the public expectation for more 
policy effort on social equity issues. It would seem that Chinese policy-makers are now paying increasing 
attention to transport related social equity issues, however, it could still be dangerous for policy-makers to 
ignore public perception of social equities under the influence of egalitarianism. 
In summary, participants identified four main types of perceived inequities related to the Beijing 
congestion charge.  
Firstly, government car users were perceived as the biggest winner of the policy because even if 
government cars are not free from the charge, tax payer need to cover their cost. Private use of government 
cars is a common phenomenon in China (Li, 1998; Zhang & Chan, 2013), however, public concern for 
Government car use is ambivalent. On the one hand, most of the participants complained that congestion 
charge would confer a new privilege to cadres, on the other hand, they permitted this new privilege on the 
grounds that criticism of the Government is forbidden. They thereafter transferred their previous discontent 
towards the Government to "the privileged" lay citizens. Privileges or the privileged class, repeatedly 
mentioned by almost all of the participants, are the most intuitive perception of social equity issues. In order 
to alleviate the feeling of being oppressed, long-term efforts should be made to increase the transparency of 
revenue reallocation and to encourage public engagement when the policy is still at the planning stage. Also, 
intensifying a clampdown on corruption could effectively decrease these perceptions. 
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Secondly, it is unavoidable that the market-oriented reform has been widening the disparity between the 
rich and the poor. Western countries promote social equity via redistribution (e.g. Dahlgren, 1991; Kvist, 
2012), however, it is debatable whether redistributive policies in China promote or reduce social equity. 
China's welfare system seems to materialise privileges rather than helping disadvantaged groups (see. Wong, 
2005; Leung & Nann, 1995; Frazier, 2010). The rich, such as cadres and employees of state-owned enterprise, 
receive a lot of benefits from the system, while the poor get few. Long-term social welfare reform is essential 
to deal with this issue since relatively poorer people can hardly ignore social inequity as long as 'the privileged 
group' gets more from the welfare system. 
Thirdly, some Beijing residents thought congestion charge is unfair because residents of other cities do 
not need to pay given the policy was proposed as one part of smog alleviation plan. This is consistent with 
evidence from Shanghai that Shanghai residents considered the car license auction policy unfair because 
residents of other cities do not need to pay (Chen & Zhao, 2013). Although most of the participants had a high 
level of smog awareness, their willingness-to-pay for smog problem was low. It is because smog is a 
nationwide problem which is not only caused by car users in Beijing. Therefore, some participants expected 
that the congestion charge could also be implemented in other cities around Beijing.  
Fourthly, China has been facing serious spatial differences in its development after the market-oriented 
reform, especially urban-rural and coastal-interior differences (Li & Yang, 2005; Démurger, et al., 2002b). 
However, at least at the early stage of the reform, these differences are mainly influenced by preferential 
policies instead of market (Démurger, et al., 2002a). The huge spatial inequalities intensify social conflicts 
between different population groups (Ho, 2005; see also. Watson, 2010). Regional discrimination is a 
common phenomenon in China (Lu, 2013), those who are originally from rich areas such as Beijing, a strong 
regional identity has formed because of the increasing localism after the reform (Li & Bachman, 1989). 
Besides, the conflict between Pekingese and new migrants is an inevitable outcome of the hukou system 
(Liang, 2015). Even though the significance of Hukou has been considerably diminished, Beijing Hukou is 
still a symbolic privilege, which prevent new migrants from getting benefits that Beijing Hukou holders enjoy 
(Lague, 2003). To mitigate the influence of perceived inequity, long-term efforts are needed to narrow the gap 
between the rich and the poor, coastal and inland area, and agricultural and non-agricultural hukou holders. 
Government car use was rarely discussed in the Western literature on transport equity issues, but it was 
one of the key concerns of the participants. Moreover, some categories can fit into the Western literature, but 
they have to be interpreted in different ways. For example, although 'inequalities between the rich and the 
poor' and 'inequalities between Pekingese and new migrants' are closely related to accessibility opportunities, 
the participants rarely talked about whether they have the access to jobs, goods, and services. They focused on 
whether other population groups have a more convenient access to those opportunities. Many participants, 
especially new migrants, mentioned social exclusions, but it is different from that in the Western literature. It 
is more of a hukou related than a transport related social exclusion. Most of them are not aware of transport 
poverty, but they put themselves into a wider society when they thought about the policy. 
Contrary to the Western literature, there is strong evidence that revenue reallocation was not a public 
concern in the Chinese context. Only two people in one group mentioned revenue reallocation spontaneously, 
while the majority of the participants were confused when they were directly asked to discuss this. It shows 
another distinguishing feature of Chinese egalitarianism, that participants only thought about abolishing other 
people's privileges, but they never talked about what they personally want to derive from this abolition. In 
other words, Chinese egalitarianism focuses on denial rather than redistribution. Policymakers could also 
make use of features of Chinese egalitarianism to achieve a higher level of acceptability by convincing 
21 
 
disadvantaged groups that other population groups, especially richer people, need to sacrifice their personal 
interests, thereby fulfilling expectations of their privilege-deprivation. However, this can only have short-term 
effect.  
Further, egalitarianism aggravates the perception of social inequities and causes resentment against the 
rich because it inclines to eliminate the difference between individuals, so that social inequities are more 
generalised and extremist. According to some of the participants, instead of the really privileged people, those 
who become richer by hard work and through their own abilities are usually the main victims of resentment. 
Therefore, egalitarian thought lead to a further social rift between different populations groups. On the one 
hand, advantaged groups are reluctant to sympathise with disadvantaged groups because they suffer from 
resentment, on the other hand, egalitarianism connives at a "reaping without sowing" illusion. Consequently, 
it causes an atmosphere of distrust and disrespect between different population groups.  
There are some limitations to this study. Firstly, there was no clearly proposed scheme at hand for 
congestion charging in Beijing, only reports that it would happen when the focus groups were conducted, so 
the policy which was used for discussion had to be hypothetical. Secondly, since participants were selected 
after online discussions, this group of people may be more sensitive to the congestion charging policy. Thirdly, 
although the 'stimulator' strategy effectively encouraged participants to share their ideas, it is likely that more 
moderate opinions were difficult to be heard when people with extreme views were debating. Fourthly, poor 
migrants inclined to go along with other people's ideas during group discussions, so it is questionable whether 
they expressed their true opinions. Lastly and most importantly, this was a qualitative study, so whilst being 
extremely useful for gaining a deep understanding of how different sectors of the Beijing population might 
respond to the introduction a congestion charge in their city, it could never be representative all the views of 
all citizens. This will be the task for further research of this issues, which proposes to conduct a randomly 
sampled survey with 1104 Beijing residents, and will be reported in subsequent papers. 
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Appendix 1 Key concerns about the Acceptability of Congestion Charge by Focus Groups 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 Group 8 Group 9 
The effectiveness of 
road pricing on 
smog and congestion 
alleviation (8 out of 
9) 
Care of posterity (6 
out of 8) 
Lose trust in experts 
(5 out of 6) 
Social equality 
issues in general (6 
out of 6) 
Social equality 
issues in general (10 
out of 10) 
The government do 
not concern about 
social inequalities (7 
out of 9) 
Local government 
don't care about new 
migrants and low 
income people (6 out 
of 11) 
New migrants are 
unequally treated in 
Beijing (7 out of 8) 
Social equality 
issues in general (6 
out of 6) 
Lose trust in experts 
(7 out of 9) 
Emigration because 
of environmental 
problems (6 out of 8) 
GDP supreme and 
political 
achievement (4 out 
of 6) 
The effectiveness of 
previous transport 
policies (5 out of 6) 
The effectiveness of 
road pricing on 
smog and congestion 
alleviation (5 out of 
10) 
Lose trust in 
government (6 out of 
9) 
Lack of transparency 
in revenue allocation 
(6 out of 11) 
The purpose of the 
policy: to grab 
money (5 out of 8) 
Government car use 
(4 out of 6) 
Lack of transparency 
in revenue allocation 
(6 out of 9) 
People need to obey 
(5 out of 8) 
People need to obey 
(4 out of 6) 
Chinese people do 
not have a sense of 
responsibility (4 out 
of 6)  
Policies 
implemented in 
foreign countries (4 
out of 10) 
Family members' 
impacts (5 out of 9) 
Social equality 
issues in general (6 
out of 11) 
Beijing hukou and 
hukou related 
equality issues (4 out 
of 8) 
The congestion 
charge is equitable 
to every car users (4 
out of 6) 
The effectiveness of 
previous transport 
policies (5 out of 9) 
Government car use 




with other possible 
solutions (4 out of 6) 
Heavy pollution 
industry and their 
contribution to smog 
(4 out of 6) 
Middle class people: 
anxiousness (4 out 
of 10) 
It is government's 
responsibility to 
solve congestion and 
smog problem (5 out 
of 9) 
Increasing burden 
for young working 
people (6 out of 11) 
It is government's 
responsibility to 
solve congestion and 
smog problem (4 out 
of 8) 
Private car users are 
not responsible for 
smog (3 out of 6) 
Driving will become 
a privilege again (5 
out of 9) 
Family members' 
impacts (4 out of 8) 
Inconvenient and 
uncomfortable 
public transport (4 
out of 6) 
Love for hometown 
Beijing (4 out of 6) 
Lack of transparency 
in revenue allocation 
(4 out of 10) 
The effectiveness of 
road pricing on 
smog and congestion 
alleviation (4 out of 
9) 
It is government's 
responsibility to 
solve congestion and 
smog problem (6 out 
of 11) 
Privileges, especially 
privileges related to 
hukou and danwei 
(organisation) (4 out 
of 8) 
The effectiveness of 
road pricing on 
smog and 
congestion 
alleviation (3 out of 
6) 
The purpose of the 
policy: to grab 
money (5 out of 9) 
Memories of blue 
sky and fresh air (4 
out of 8) 
The purpose of the 
policy: to grab 
money (4 out of 6) 
Passenger capacity 
of public transport 
should be increased  
(4 out of 6) 
Lose trust in experts 
(4 out of 10) 
Living cost in 
Beijing and housing 
price (4 out of 9) 
The purpose of the 
policy: to grab 
money (5 out of 11) 
Beijing drifters' 
quality of life (4 out 
of 8) 
Lose trust in 
government (2 out 
of 6) 
Bad behaviours of 
new migrants (5 out 
of 9) 
Love for hometown 
Beijing (4 out of 8) 
Lose trust in 
government (3 out of 
6) 
Lose trust in 
government (3 out of 
6) 
Middle class people: 
identity (3 out of 10) 
Political corruption 
in general (4 out of 
9) 
Lose trust in 
government (5 out of 
11) 
Social equality 
issues in general (4 
out of 8) 
Resentment against 
the rich (2 out of 6) 
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Love for hometown 
Beijing (4 out of 9) 
Environmental 
problems in general 
(4 out of 8) 
Public transport: 
difficult to improve 
(3 out of 6) 
The effectiveness of 
road pricing on 
smog and congestion 
alleviation (3 out of 
6) 
Lose trust in 
government (3 out of 
10) 
Comparison between 
their own hometown 
and Beijing & 
resentment to 
Beijing (4 out of 9) 
Resentment against 
the rich (5 out of 11) 
The effectiveness of 
road pricing on 
smog and congestion 
alleviation (4 out of 
8) 
Political corruption 
in general (2 out of 
6) 
The special position 
of Beijing: the face 
of China (4 out of 9) 
Privileges (4 out of 
8) 
The effectiveness of 
previous transport 
policies (3 out of 6) 
Lack of transparency 
in revenue allocation 
(3 out of 6) 
Government car use 
(3 out of 10) 
Congestion charge is 
a kind of corruption 
(3 out of 9) 
Fabricated news by 
the government (4 
out of 11) 
Comparison between 
their own hometown 
and Beijing & 
resentment to 
Beijing (3 out of 8) 
The passenger 
capacity of subway 
system should be 
increased (2 out of 
6) 
Luxury cars in 
Beijing (4 out of 9) 
Lose trust in official 
media (4 out of 8) 
Government car use 
(3 out of 6) 
Care of posterity (3 
out of 6) 
Environmental 
problems (3 out of 
10) 
New migrants feel 
inferior to others (2 
out of 9) 
Living cost in 
Beijing and housing 
price (4 out of 11) 
Crowded public 
transport, especially 
subway (3 out of 8) 
Car users should 
balance cost and 
benefits (2 out of 6) 
Political corruption 
in general (4 out of 
9) 
Resentment against 
the rich (4 out of 8) 
New riches: bad 
behaviour and others 
(3 out of 6) 
New migrants and 
problems caused by 
them (3 out of 6) 
Beijing drifters' 
quality of life (2 out 
of 10) 
The effectiveness of 
previous transport 
policies (2 out of 9) 
Political corruption 
in general (4 out of 
11) 
Care of posterity (3 
out of 8) 
Taxi and buses 
should be free of 
charge (2 out of 6) 
People need to obey 
(4 out of 9) 
Nationalism makes 
foreign experience 
less convincible (4 
out of 8) 
A Chinese way to 
solve problems: 
oversimplified and 
crude (3 out of 6) 
Beijing culture (2 
out of 6) 
Inconvenient and 
uncomfortable 
public transport (2 
out of 10) 
Beijing hukou and 
hukou related 
equality issues (2 out 
of 9) 
Pollution source: 
private car or heavy 
industry (4 out of 
11) 
Love for hometown 
Beijing (2 out of 8) 
Charging something 
free of charge before 
is not acceptable (2 
out of 6) 
Lose trust in 
government (4 out of 
9) 
The effectiveness of 
road pricing on 
smog and congestion 
alleviation (3 out of 
8) 
Lack of transparency 
in revenue allocation 
(3 out of 6) 
The special position 
of Beijing makes it 
very attractive to 
other Chinese people 
(2 out of 6) 
Uneven regional 
development (2 out 
of 10) 
It is embarrassing to 
use public transport 
sometimes (2 out of 
9) 
The relationship 
between private car 
use and smog is not 
clear (3 out of 11) 
The effectiveness of 
previous transport 
policies (2 out of 8) 
Beijing drifters' 




foreign countries (3 
out of 9) 
Increasing burden 
for young working 
people (3 out of 8) 
Lack of legal basis 
and a concrete action 
plan (3 out of 6) 
Uneven regional 
development (2 out 
of 6) 
Privileges (2 out of 
10) 
Pollution source: 
private car or heavy 
industry (2 out of 9) 
People need to obey 
(3 out of 11) 
Policies 
implemented in 
foreign countries (2 
out of 8) 
Traffic restrictions 
based on the last 
digit of license plate: 
not effective at all (1 
out of 6) 
Beijing culture (3 
out of 9) 
Limited access to 
information (3 out of 
8) 
People don't have 
the right to choose (3 
out of 6) 
Bad urban planning 
(2 out of 6) 
Limited access to 
information (2 out of 
10) 
Resentment against 
the rich (2 out of 9) 
New migrants are 
unequally treated in 
Beijing (3 out of 11) 
Political corruption 
in general (2 out of 
8) 
Environmental 




standard based on 
Memories of blue 
sky and fresh air (2 
The effectiveness of 
road pricing is 
unimportant (2 out 
The policy should 
have the same 
constraints to the 
The gap between the 
ruling class and 
ordinary people (2 
Limited access to 
information (2 out of 
People originally 
from rural area may 
have different travel 
Chinese people are 
familiar with taking 
advantage of 
The relationship 
between private car 
use and smog is not 
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household income (3 
out of 9) 
out of 8) of 6) rich & the poor (2 
out of 6) 
out of 10) 9) behaviour (2 out of 
11) 
loopholes (2 out of 
8) 
clear (1 out of 6) 
Memories of blue 
sky and fresh air (2 
out of 9) 
Lose trust in 
government (2 out of 
8) 
Social equality 
issues in general (2 
out of 6) 
A Chinese way to 
solve problems: 
oversimplified and 
crude (2 out of 6) 
Lose trust in official 
media (2 out of 10) 
Uneven regional 
development (2 out 
of 9) 
A better public 
transport system in 
necessary (2 out of 
11) 
Retired people will 
not be affected by 
the policy (2 out of 
8) 
New riches: bad 
behaviour and others 
(1 out of 6) 
Chinese propaganda: 
the Western way is 
not suitable for 
China (2 out of 9) 
The policy should 
have the same 
constraints to the 
rich & the poor (2 
out of 8) 
Negative attitude 
towards new 
migrants (2 out of 6) 
Memories of blue 
sky and fresh air (1 
out of 6) 
It is ridiculous to 
talk about externality 
of congestion charge 




department do not 
have real power (2 
out of 9) 
Heavy pollution 
industry and their 
contribution to smog 
(2 out of 11) 
Living cost in 
Beijing and housing 
price (1 out of 8) 
People should be 
aware of long-term 
benefit of the policy 
(1 out of 6) 
The increasing gap 
between the rich and 
the poor (2 out of 9) 
Fabricating & 
spreading rumours 
(2 out of 8) 
Policy-makers are 
indolent, sloppy, and 
neglectful of their 
duties (2 out of 6) 
The purpose of the 
policy: to grab 
money (1 out of 6) 
Living cost, housing 
price in Beijing (2 
out of 10) 
Increasing burden 
for young working 
people (2 out of 9) 
This policy is 
especially unequal to 
new migrants (2 out 
of 11) 
Trust in government 
and cadres (1 out of 
8) 
Powerless public (1 
out of 6) 
Resentment against 
the rich (2 out of 9) 
Lack of transparency 
in revenue allocation 
(2 out of 8) 
Political corruption 
in general (2 out of 
6) 
Lose trust in experts 
(1 out of 6) 
New migrants are 
unequally treated in 
Beijing (2 out of 10) 
Other options could 
be more effective (2 
out of 9) 
Privileges (2 out of 
11) 
Environmental 
problems (1 out of 8) 
Congestion makes 
public transport 
worse (1 out of 6) 
The policy should 
have the same 
constraints to the 
rich & the poor (2 
out of 9) 
Chinese people are 
indifferent about 




(2 out of 6) 
Environmental 
problems (1 out of 6) 
Need to own a car 
even though they 
don't really use it (2 
out of 10) 
Lay citizens are 
victims of smog and 
congestion, should 
not charge them (2 
out of 9) 
Family members' 
impacts (2 out of 11) 
Poorer people should 
pay less than richer 
people (1 out of 8) 
A strong policy is 
necessary to 
alleviate congestion 
and smog problem 
(1 out of 6) 
Chinese people are 
indifferent about 




foreign countries (2 
out of 8) 
Obscurantism (2 out 
of 6) 
Privileges (1 out of 
6) 
The purpose of the 
policy: to grab 
money (1 out of 10) 
Smog problem on 
foreign media (1 out 
of 9) 
Lose trust in official 
media (2 out of 11) 
Resentment against 
the rich (1 out of 8) 
Taxi drivers could 
get direct benefit 
from the policy (1 
out of 6) 
A better public 
transport system in 
necessary (2 out of 
9) 
Problems in public 
transport system (1 
out of 8) 
Chinese people do 
not have a sense of 





(1 out of 6) 
Regional inequalities 
are inevitable (1 out 
of 10) 
A better public 
transport system in 
necessary (1 out of 
9) 
Beijing hukou and 
hukou related 
equality issues (2 out 
of 11) 
Powerless public (1 
out of 9) 
People are unwilling 
to pay for smog (1 
out of 6) 
Powerless public (2 




(1 out of 8) 
Bad urban planning 
(2 out of 6) 
Social media: a new 
source of 
information (1 out of 
6) 
Social media: a new 
source of 




foreign countries (1 
out of 9) 
Uneven regional 
development (2 out 
of 11) 
A Chinese way to 
solve problems: 
oversimplified and 




The special position 
of Beijing makes it 
very attractive to 
other Chinese people 
(2 out of 9) 
Social media: a new 
source of 





resources (2 out of 
6) 
Political corruption 
in general (1 out of 
6) 
A Chinese way to 
solve problems: 
oversimplified and 
crude (1 out of 10) 
The purpose of the 
policy: to grab 
money (1 out of 9) 
New migrants feel 
inferior to others (1 
out of 11) 
Lack of transparency 
in revenue allocation 
(1 out of 9) 
 
Smog problem 
cannot be solved 
because of heavy 




department do not 
have real power (1 
out of 8) 
Love for hometown 
Beijing (1 out of 6) 
Chinese people are 
indifferent about 
public affairs (1 out 
of 6) 
The relationship 
between private car 
use and smog is not 
clear (1 out of 10) 
Lose trust in experts 
(1 out of 9) 
Comparison between 
their own hometown 
and Beijing & 
resentment to 
Beijing (1 out of 11) 
Chinese people are 
indifferent about 
public affairs (1 out 
of 9) 
 
People should not 
pay because they are 
victims of smog (1 
out of 9) 
Chinese people do 
not have a sense of 
responsibility (1 out 
of 8) 
Manpower and 
material resources to 
implement the policy 
(1 out of 6) 
The government 
should subsidise 
poorer drivers (1 out 
of 6) 
GDP supreme and 
political 
achievement (1 out 
of 10) 
Social equality 
issues in general (1 
out of 9) 
The special position 
of Beijing: the face 
of China (1 out of 
11) 
People need to obey 
(1 out of 9) 
 
Environmental 
problems in general 
(1 out of 9) 
Car dependency (1 
out of 8) 
Inner city shops and 
small business: 




foreign countries (1 
out of 6) 
Political corruption 
in general (1 out of 
6) 
The relationship 
between private car 
use and smog is not 
clear (1 out of 9) 
Smog problem on 
foreign media (1 out 
of 11) 
The gap between the 
ruling class and 
ordinary people (1 
out of 9) 
 
New migrants don't 
have a sense of 
responsibility (1 out 
of 9) 
Bad urban planning 
(1 out of 8)  
Privileges (1 out of 
6) 
 People need to obey 
(1 out of 10) 
Powerless public (1 
out of 9) 
Environmental 
problems (1 out of 
11) 
Safety issues for 






(1 out of 9) 
Low public 
involvement (1 out 
8) 
Uneven regional 
development (1 out 
of 6) 
 Unequal allocation 
of social resources 
(1 out of 10) 
Fabricating & 
spreading rumours 
(1 out of 9) 
Policies 
implemented in 
foreign countries (1 
out of 11) 
Family members' 
impacts (1 out of 9) 
 
  Transport and 
environment 
protection 
department do not 
have real power (1 
out of 6) 
 Chinese people are 
indifferent about 
public affairs (1 out 
of 10) 
A Chinese way to 
solve problems: 
oversimplified and 
crude (1 out of 9) 
The special position 
of Beijing makes it 
very attractive to 
other Chinese people 
(1 out of 11) 
Social pressure from 
relatives, friends and 
colleagues because 
of not having a car 
(1 out of 9) 
 
  Cadres have no 
responsibility for 
unsuccessful policies 
 Cars are important in 
marriage and dating 
(1 out of 10) 
This policy is 
especially unequal to 




China: a populous 




(1 out of 6) of 9) (1 out of 11) 
  Chinese people are 
indifferent about 
public affairs (1 out 
of 6) 
 Limited parking 
space (1 out of 10) 
GDP supreme and 
political 
achievement (1 out 
of 9) 
Chinese people are 
indifferent about 
public affairs (1 out 
of 11) 
  
  Increasing burden 
for young working 
people (1 out of 6) 
 EVs could alleviate 






(1 out of 9) 
The effectiveness of 
road pricing on 
smog and congestion 
alleviation (1 out of 
11) 
  
  Safety issues for 
bike users (1 out of 
6) 
  Lay citizens may get 
benefits from a 
policy, but the 
benefits are just 
by-product of the 
policy (1 out of 9) 
Legal basis of the 
congestion charge (1 
out of 11) 
  
  Powerless public (1 
out of 6) 
  People need to obey 
(1 out of 9) 
   
  Education about 
environmental 
problems (1 out of 6) 
  Bad urban planning 
(1 out of 9) 
   
  Use other new 
technologies to solve 
smog and congestion 
problems (1 out of 6) 
  Chinese people are 
indifferent about 
public affairs (1 out 
of 9) 
   
  New migrant and 
Pekingese should 
have the same 
opportunity to live in 
Beijing (1 out of 6) 
  Heavy pollution 
industry and their 
contribution to smog 
(1 out of 9) 







Appendix 2 Key determinants of public acceptability of congestion charge 
 
